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Prosecuting Children in Times of Conflict: The West African Experience
by David M. Crane*
It was a clear hot day. The school meeting hall rippled with 
the heat of over five hundred persons. I had been speaking to the 
students, faculty, and others in one of my many town hall meet-
ings I conducted throughout Sierra Leone. The purpose of the 
meetings was to provide a vehicle for the people to talk about 
the war, the crimes, their pain, and other issues related to our 
work. As I finished answering a question, a shy, small arm was 
raised in the middle of the hall. I walked back to the student. He 
meekly stood up, head bowed, and mumbled, loud enough for 
those around him to hear, “I killed people, I am sorry, I did not 
mean it.” I went over to him, tears in my eyes, hugged him and 
said, “Of course you didn’t mean it. I forgive you.” 1
IntroductIon
For the First time in history, those who bear the greatest responsibility for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious violations of international humanitarian 
law that took place during the conflict in Sierra Leone have been 
charged with the use of child soldiers.2 The use of children in 
armed conflict is an age-old issue.3 Modern international norms, 
however, have identified and outlawed their use and have 
largely excused them for their actions. The Special Court for 
Sierra Leone (the Court) is on the cutting edge of international 
criminal law in holding accountable warlords, commanders, 
and politicians who turned to children as young as six to carry 
out orders that sometimes resulted in war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. The cynical recruitment of children, forced 
to fight under great duress for ill-gotten gains, is no longer ever 
an excusable act.
Only in the past ten years has the international community 
begun to grapple with the scourge of child soldiers.4 A 1996 
report to the Secretary General laid out a comprehensive pro-
gram to protect children during armed conflict.5 The report 
dramatically declared:
[M]ore and more of the world is being sucked into a deso-
late moral vacuum. This is a space devoid of the most basic 
human values; a space in which children are slaughtered, 
raped, and maimed; a space in which children are exploited 
as soldiers; a space in which children are starved and 
exposed to extreme brutality. Such unregulated terror and 
violence speak of deliberate victimization. There are few 
further depths to which humanity can sink.6
This article highlights the Court’s groundbreaking efforts to 
bring to justice those who destroyed a generation of children, 
and discusses the decision not to prosecute child soldiers on both 
legal and moral grounds. The article will outline the conflict’s 
history, explaining the role children played in Sierra Leone’s 
civil war in the 1990s and the current state of the law related 
to children in conflicts. It then addresses why children are not 
liable for crimes committed on the battlefield, concluding with a 
useful analogy to Omar Khadr,7 a child involved in the conflict 
in Afghanistan who should be immediately released from deten-
tion because the military commission trying him lacks personal 
jurisdiction. Khadr has a protected status under international 
humanitarian law and is not liable for his alleged actions. 
the conflIct
Sierra Leone sits along the West African coast, a small state 
in a string of nations linked together by a colonial past, with a 
history of poor governance, conflict, and disease. West Africa 
generally, and Sierra Leone in particular, possess vast natural 
resources, including diamonds, rutile, bauxite, and other min-
erals. These commodities, however, are Sierra Leone’s curse. 
Corruption and diamonds were the catalysts that ignited a con-
flict that resulted in the murder, maiming, mutilation, and rape 
of over a half-million people in West Africa.
Prostrate before Libyan head of state Muammar al-Gaddafi, 
these struggling former colonies of France and Great Britain 
were vulnerable to unrest, conflict, and coup d’états. In the 
early 1990s, young ruthless leaders, fresh from Libyan training 
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All sides of the conflict in Sierra Leone enlisted and used children in 
hostilities.
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facilities, descended upon West Africa to begin a decade-long 
campaign to conquer the region politically, by force if neces-
sary. Charles Taylor, who had escaped from prison in the United 
States, slipped quietly into Liberia and began a long civil war. 
Taylor looked west over the border with Sierra Leone to that 
country’s alluvial diamond fields and partnered with Foday 
Sankoh, another graduate of the Libyan training camps and cor-
poral in the Sierra Leonean Army. Diamonds would help keep 
Taylor’s revolution and bank account well financed.8
With backing and planning assistance from Gadaffi and 
Burkina Faso’s President Blaise Campaoré, Taylor assisted 
Sankoh in launching two strikes into eastern Sierra Leone in 
March 1991.9 Sankoh was admonished by Taylor to vigorously 
recruit civilians to the cause, by terror and force, if necessary.10 
What followed was a death struggle between various warring 
factions, each brutalizing civilians, particularly women and chil-
dren. The civil war, under Taylor and Sankoh’s Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF) leadership, evolved into a terror campaign 
seeking to control the diamond fields and subscribe the entire 
nation into a joint criminal enterprise. Pain, suffering, and agony 
reached new dimensions. The atrocities committed almost defied 
description. “Believe the unbelievable,” is what I told the cham-
ber responsible for trying the Civil Defense Force (CDF) leader-
ship in the opening statement that began their  prosecution. 
All sides of the conflict in Sierra Leone used children. A 
favorite rebel tactic to induce children to join a force was to 
move in and surround a village. Children were made to kill their 
parents and then driven into the bush and forced to serve as 
soldiers, often for many years. Thousands of children, ranging 
from six to 18 years of age, under the influence of cocaine and 
marijuana distributed by commanders, roamed battlefields and 
destroyed their own country. Over time, the warring factions 
became their homes and families. A vast majority of children 
had no choice but to fight, murder, rape, and mutilate, or they 
would be killed themselves. 
When the conflict staggered to its bloody conclusion in 2002, 
an entire nation lay in ruins. Child soldiers found themselves 
with no families, little to no education, and a society unable to 
assist them in rebuilding their lives. Many were physically and 
psychologically damaged. The lost generation of Sierra Leone 
now sits by pock-marked roads with little hope but for someone 
to return them to the only life they had ever known  — fighting, 
raping, pillaging, and murdering.11
the SpecIal court for SIerra leone
The Special Court was an innovative step in the evolution of 
international war crimes tribunals. Even with the establishment 
of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the Special Court is a 
model that can work in the future to combat impunity in troubled 
areas of the world.
The Court is a hybrid tribunal, independent of the United 
Nations (UN) and any state.12 Established through an agreement 
between the UN and the Government of Sierra Leone in January 
2002, the Court is both international and national.13 The signing 
of this treaty was the culmination of a year and a half of dis-
cussions following a UN Security Council resolution directing 
the Secretary-General to enter negotiations to create the Court. 
Sierra Leone’s national parliament implemented the treaty by 
passing a law in March 2002.14
The Court’s mandate is to try those who “bear the greatest 
responsibility” for serious violations of international humanitar-
ian law, including the laws of war, crimes against humanity, 
and certain crimes under Sierra Leonean law.15 Crimes against 
humanity encompass widespread or systematic murder, rape, 
enslavement, sexual slavery, and other forms of sexual violence, 
torture, and other inhumane acts, including unlawfully recruit-
ing and using children. Cases can be brought against anyone 
who committed crimes or was responsible for crimes committed 
in Sierra Leone since November 30, 1996.16 This very specific 
mandate is key to the Court’s success. 
Importantly, the Court sits in the country where the viola-
tions occurred. This is the right place for the Court to directly 
deliver justice to the people who suffered during the civil war. 
The courtroom is open to the public. An ambitious outreach and 
public information program is in place to keep Sierra Leoneans 
informed and engaged in the Court’s work, for the Court 
belongs, first and foremost, to them. 
The Court hopes to make a lasting contribution to promoting 
accountability and the rule of law. Capacity-building and legacy 
activities constitute an important part of its work. Courtroom 
facilities will be turned over to the people of Sierra Leone at 
the conclusion of the trials. In addition, the Court hired a high 
percentage of Sierra Leonean professionals and reached out to 
the local legal community to design initiatives to bolster legal 
reform. These include facilitating scholarship opportunities and 
training programs in international humanitarian law, as well as 
establishing a partnership with the local law school. Trials may 
end, but the Court’s legacy will remain.
the IndIctmentS and the chargeS
Criminal investigations began two weeks after the Prosecutor 
arrived in Sierra Leone in August 2002. On March 3, 2003, the 
Prosecutor signed eight indictments and a trial chamber judge 
confirmed the indictments in London on March 7. On March 
10, just seven months after the Prosecutor’s arrival, members 
of the investigations team, along with the Sierra Leone Police, 
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Many children were dragged into the bush and forced to serve as 
 soldiers. Some were made to murder their parents.
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launched “Operation Justice,” simultaneously arresting all 
indictees in Sierra Leone at the time, including the Minister of 
Interior, Samuel Hinga Norman. A total of 13 indictments have 
been issued to date. The six indictees arrested in March 2003, 
plus three more arrested over a period of several months, are 
detained at the Court compound in Freetown. Two of the three 
joint trials are completed with a third expected to be complete 
in 2008, including the trial against former Liberian President 
Charles Taylor.17
The Court has been encouraged by the public response to the 
indictments and trials. Peace has held, and many have spoken 
out to support the Court’s work. According to polls, over two-
thirds of the population believe the Court is necessary, with 
another two-thirds believing it will deter future conflict.18
Sankoh in Liberia in February 1991, children were rounded up 
to bulk up Sierra Leonean forces. The CDF, particularly the 
Kamajors — a traditional ethnic warrior group — subsequently 
initiated children into their ranks. Children served on all sides 
throughout the ten-year conflict.
The charges in the indictments stem from crimes enumerated 
in the Statute. The specific crime of the use of child soldiers 
is found in Article 4, “other serious violations of international 
humanitarian law.” This provision allows the Prosecutor to 
indict a person for three international crimes — intentionally 
attacking civilians (Article 4a); crimes against peacekeepers or 
humanitarian assistance workers (Article 4b); and the recruit-
ment and use of child soldiers (Article 4c). The Prosecutor used 
all three in the various joint criminal indictments.
“The Trial Chamber sent a clear message to the world 
that a person who recruits child soldiers into a conflict is 
a war criminal, but the children recruited and forced  
to commit unspeakable acts are not.”
Each indictee has been jointly and severally charged, and, 
thus far, largely convicted, for using child soldiers, among other 
international crimes. The extent of their involvement was wide-
spread and systematic. Each indictee had command responsibil-
ity of the combatants that he led, including child soldiers. The 
various combatants had small boy units (SBUs). Some of these 
SBUs had specific duties. For example, in the January 1999 
burning of Freetown, children were part of squads ordered to 
mutilate, burn, and pillage. Child soldiers were seen throughout 
the three week occupation carrying burlap bags full of body 
parts, trailing blood along the way. They were required to bring 
the bags to their commanders. If they refused, they were usually 
killed.
In their amended indictment, the RUF leadership is charged 
with recruiting and using child soldiers, specifically conscript-
ing or enlisting children under the age of 15 into armed forces 
or groups, or using them to participate actively in hostilities.19 
Similarly, the leadership of the Armed Forces Revolutionary 
Council (AFRC) was charged and convicted for these crimes.20 
The dreaded leadership of the CDF was charged and convicted 
for the unlawful recruitment of child soldiers.21 Taylor is also 
charged with recruiting and using child soldiers, as is fugitive 
indictee Johnny Paul Koroma. The Prosecutor likewise charged 
deceased indictees Foday Sankoh and Samuel Bockerie. 
It is alleged that all indictees are individually criminally lia-
ble for using children in armed conflict, either under the aiding 
and abetting theory in Article 6.1 of the Statute of the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone (the Statute) or, alternatively, under the 
command responsibility theory of Article 6.3 of the Statute. 
Each indictee is charged with recruiting and using children 
during all times relevant to the indictment. As Taylor directed 
On June 20, 2007, Trial Chamber II entered a finding of 
guilty against the leadership of the AFRC on 11 of the 14 counts 
against them. One count on which they were found guilty was 
the unlawful recruitment of child soldiers under the age of 15 
into an armed force. This marked the first time in history where 
commanders and political leaders were held liable for this 
recently defined crime against humanity.22 The Trial Chamber 
sent a clear message to the world that a person who recruits 
child soldiers into a conflict is a war criminal, but the children 
recruited and forced to commit unspeakable acts are not. The 
Appellate Chamber upheld these finding on February 22, 2008.
the challengeS
During the pre-trial phase, several indictees made jurisdic-
tional challenges to the charges and to the Court itself. On June 
26, 2003, Hinga Norman specifically challenged the charge 
against him relating to the use of child soldiers as not being a 
crime at the time of its alleged commission. Another indictee 
intervened as well. This preliminary motion was referred to the 
Appeals Chamber pursuant to Rule 72(E) of the Court’s Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence after the Prosecutor’s July 7, 2003 
response. Various amicus briefs were filed by the University of 
Toronto, International Human Rights Clinic, while the Court, 
also, invited UNICEF to submit an amicus brief.23 An oral 
hearing occurred on November 6, 2003, with a follow on post-
hearing submission by the Prosecutor on November 24, 2003.
On May 31, 2004, the Appeals Chamber issued the decision 
on the preliminary motion based on lack of jurisdiction (child 
recruitment) dismissing the motion. The Appeals Chamber 
held that child recruitment was criminalized under customary 
international law at the time frames relevant to the indictment, 
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thus protecting the legality and specificity principles Norman 
questioned. This was another first in legal history: a high court 
ruled that the recruitment of child soldiers was a crime under 
international law.24
the State of the law
The Appeals Chamber’s decision correctly reflects the state 
of the law.25 The use of children in warfare is not a new phenom-
enon. Children have followed armies for centuries as support 
personnel — as pages, water carriers, and musicians, particu-
larly drummers. In navies throughout Europe, nobility seconded 
children to warships to learn a trade. Others were pressed into 
seamanship.
With the advent of The Hague rules governing weapons 
in war in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the 
rules of warfare took on a universal status. Coupled with the 
Red Cross movement, the role of the combatant became a legal 
term of art. The status of the non-combatant also began to take 
shape.26 Yet specifics regarding combatants’ ages were not 
well-defined early in the regulation process. The international 
community focused more on regulating weapons that would 
cause unnecessary suffering and the types of targets combatants 
could engage.
principles in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which 
echoes fundamental principles of human dignity found in the 
Geneva Conventions.28 The world had a new standard for pro-
tecting non-combatants’ rights and status in wartime.
One of the tragedies of the ensuing Cold War was the con-
flicts ignited in developing country “flashpoints.” Children were 
once again the victims. In the 1970s, the world paused long 
enough to reconsider the Geneva Conventions of 1949, shaping 
them through two new protocols to reflect the realities of mod-
ern armed conflict.29 Once again the bar had been identified and 
raised. Most of the nations of the world, including many newly 
independent states, agreed to the new standards.30 
The Protocols specifically prohibit the use of children in 
armed conflict. The criminality of the act of using children in 
conflict, however, is not specifically laid out. The implication 
is that violating the Geneva Conventions’ provisions related to 
civilians as non-combatants implies a grave breach when using 
children in combat.31 Such breaches impose a duty to investigate 
and prosecute upon all signatories.32 
The subsequent adoption of the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (CRC) highlights the prohibition against the use 
of children in armed conflict.33 It is my judgment that the CRC 
criminalizes the concept of child recruitment. One can argue 
that child recruitment as a crime is reflective of customary 
inter national law.34 The CRC requires national jurisdictions to 
 establish a minimum age at which criminal responsibility may 
be assigned.35 Article 1 of the CRC defines children as “all 
human beings below the age of 18.” 36 Additionally, the CRC 
Optional Protocol II admonishes armed groups that are distinct 
from armed forces of a state not to recruit or use in hostilities, 
under any circumstances, persons under 18.37 The applicable 
international agreements also cover the detention of delin-
quents and the issues related to this stage of the juvenile justice 
 process.38 
Despite states’ political and legal recognition that child 
recruitment was a universal crime and that children had a special 
status in conflict, child recruitment continued unabated. Millions 
of children died in the 1980s and 1990s, mainly in Africa where 
children played a significant role in armed conflicts. The 1996 
Secretary-General’s report on this issue stunned the UN by high-
lighting the extent of the problem throughout the world. There 
were calls for action and an evolving plan emerged to monitor 
recruitment of child soldiers.
In the late 1990s, the international community began to 
develop a mechanism to prosecute war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. The Rome Statute created the ICC, which 
is now the world’s attempt to stamp out impunity. The Rome 
Statute specifically states that the recruitment of children under 
the age of 15 is a “serious violation of international humanitar-
ian law.” 39
the decISIon not to proSecute the chIld SoldIerS 
of weSt afrIca
The Statute of the Special Court gives the Prosecutor author-
ity to indict children for crimes they committed between the 
ages of 15 and 18. The basis for including this controversial 
provision was to give the Prosecutor legal authority to prosecute 
any child soldier he might consider as having borne the greatest 
responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity com-
mitted during Sierra Leone’s civil war. 
“Legally, morally, and 
politically the international 
community . . . has 
separated out children from 
the horrors of combat, to 
protect and nurture, to 
rehabilitate and support, 
not to punish.”
After World War I and into World War II, the shift away 
from universal rules relating to weapons and targets began. By 
the end of the two wars, the focus was rightfully on non-com-
batants. The founding of the UN in 1945 created a permanent 
body that could be a voice for non-combatants, particularly for 
children. 
The universal rules began to narrow and define the special 
status of non-combatants. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 are 
the cornerstone of these rules, which by their nature, protect 
persons who are “out of the combat” — prisoners of war, the 
shipwrecked, and civilians.27 It is here that children became 
specially protected under international law. Around this time 
the international community laid out international human rights 
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The Prosecution decided early in developing a prosecuto-
rial plan that no child between 15 and 18 had the sufficiently 
blameworthy state of mind to commit war crimes in a conflict 
setting. Aware of the clear legal standard highlighted in interna-
tional humanitarian law, the intent in choosing not to prosecute 
was to rehabilitate and reintegrate this lost generation back into 
society. It would have been impractical to prosecute even par-
ticularly violent children because there were so many. Further, it 
was imperative that the prosecution seriously consider the clear 
intent of the UN Security Council and the drafters of the Statute 
creating the Court to prosecute those and only those who bore 
the greatest responsibility — those who aided and abetted; cre-
ated and sustained the conflict; and planned, ordered, or directed 
the atrocities. No child did this in Sierra Leone. 
In November 2002, the Prosecution announced that child sol-
diers would not be prosecuted, as they were not legally liable for 
acts committed during the conflict. There was universal praise 
for this decision. It took prosecuting child soldiers themselves 
for the tragedy they have experienced off the legal table, instead 
placing children on the rehabilitation track, as is the appropriate 
norm under international law. 
concluSIon: the future
Despite assertions that the recruitment of child soldiers is an 
international crime, the tragedy continues worldwide. Between 
1986 and 1996, over two million children were killed in armed 
conflict.40 Countless more have been killed since, many in places 
such as Sierra Leone. A February 2005 UN report specifically 
singled out 42 armed groups in 11 countries. The UN Secretary-
General’s Special Envoy for Children in Armed Conflict, Olara 
Otunu, stated that these armed groups should be punished for 
war crimes or crimes against humanity for what they have done 
to children.41
Certainly, there is an increasing awareness of the scourge of 
child soldiers and a shift towards action. The UN must be at the 
forefront of this effort, backed by a unified Security Council that 
takes swift and decisive action when confronted with the issue. 
International courts will have to aggressively charge this crime 
in future indictments to help prevent the practice of using child 
soldiers. 
The Court’s Norman appellate decision and its subsequent 
conviction of the leadership of the AFRC, as well as the con-
viction of Norman’s co-defendants in the CDF case, both in 
2007, will certainly help advance the jurisprudence on child 
recruitment. The ICC’s statute contains a provision identical 
to the Special Court’s Statute related to recruitment of children 
under the age of 15. The ICC will, thus, be able to look to the 
groundbreaking work of the Special Court in charging warlords, 
politicians, and governments who continue to ignore the clear 
prohibition for this criminal conduct.42 Only when the rule of 
law is enforced will abusers of children be held accountable at 
the international level, and only then will this crime begin to 
diminish.
And the children truly are the victims in this scenario. Just as 
we could not hold these Sierra Leonean children responsible for 
the horrific violence they were forced to carry out, we also can-
not hold similar children involved in other conflicts accountable 
for their acts, no matter our level of interest in the region or that 
our forces were the targets of the violence. 
Omar Khadr, a young Canadian, could have been a child 
in Sierra Leone. But he was in Afghanistan, in similar circum-
stances, not of his making or under his control, in an environ-
ment from which, as a child, there was no escape. Legally, 
morally, and politically the international community, including 
the United States, has separated out children from the horrors of 
combat, to protect and nurture, to rehabilitate and support, not 
to punish. No children found in combat should be held liable 
for their acts. The jurisprudence of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone demonstrates that this is the legal standard of the world 
community and of the United States. 
I will close with another tragedy in this ten-year long tale of 
horror:
[A child] lived in a village in the Kono district. [His family 
was] told that the rebels were going to attack . . . . [H]e fled 
into the bush with his parents and brother, but [they] were 
caught by the RUF. The rebels took his younger brother and 
himself to Kaiama along with thirteen other boys. The rebels 
lined the fifteen children up and offered them a choice: Join 
one line if they wanted to be a rebel, another line if they 
wanted to be freed and allowed to go home. All fifteen of 
these boys . . . joined the line for freedom. It was the wrong 
choice. They were accused of sabotage to the revolution. To 
keep them from escaping each was held down, screaming, 
and one-by-one had AFRC and/or RUF carved into their 
chests with the blade of a sword. The [child] was now just 
marked property. . . . . [H]is scarred chest . . . to this very 
day bears the letters: A-F-R-C R-U-F. 43
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